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The legacy of Newton for the pre-Critical Kant Michela Massimi 
Introduction
Newton's far-reaching influence for Kant's philosophy of nature is well documented, and has rightly been at the center of an important literature. No one more than Kant was responsible for placing Newton's natural philosophy center-stage in the philosophical milieu of the eighteenth century. Yet no one more than Kant had a complex and nuanced approach to some key aspects of Newtonian science. While much ink has been spilled over Kant's allegiance to Newton in the Critical period, 1 Kant's early acquaintance with Newtonianism has not received a similar degree of attention. 2 Yet the pre-Critical period is key to understanding the formation and evolution of some seminal ideas of Kant. The pre-Critical period can also reveal the idiosyncratic blend of intellectual traditions and scientific sources, which is so distinctive of the early Kant. The goal of this chapter is to offer a very brief survey of Newton's legacy for the pre-Critical Kant (i.e. before the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770).
Over the past three decades, important work has been done to clarify how Kant's view of geometry and mathematics 3 was inspired by Newton, as much as his mature view on Dynamics and Mechanics seems to have been shaped upon Newtonian mechanics.
This trend in Kantian studies mirrors a similar one in Newton studies, where scholars have paid increasing attention to the broader philosophical project surrounding Newtonian science. 4 Was Kant an unfailing supporter of Newton all along? Should we read Kant's philosophy of nature as providing a systematic philosophical framework for Newtonian science?
While it cannot be gainsaid that Newton played a key role in influencing the young Kant and his (early and mature) reflections on nature, the answers to the two questions above are not as platitudinous as they may seem. For Kant's philosophy of nature 1 See Friedman (1992a) and ; Plaass (1965) ; Pollok (2001) ; Smith (2013b) ; Tuschling (1971) ; Warren (2010) ; and Watkins (1998a Watkins ( ), (1998b Watkins ( ), (2001 just to mention a few examples. 2 For some relevant exceptions, see Adickes (1924) ; Grillenzoni (1998) ; Polonoff (1973) ; Schönfeld (2000) ; Tonelli (1959) ; Watkins (2005) . 3 See for example DiSalle (2006) ; and Domski (2013) . 4 See Janiak (2008) ; Janiak and Schliesser (2012) ; Brading (2012) ; and Schliesser (2011) , among others. Acta Eruditorum, or the proceedings of the Berlin Royal Academy of Sciences. We can only reconstruct these sources from explicit references in Kant's early writings. At a glance, these sources reveal that the young Kant was mostly (but not exclusively) acquainted with Newton second-hand. Namely, the Newton, who had either been targeted in Leibnizian-Wolffian quarters, or celebrated by British natural philosophers and Newtonian supporters in the Continent (especially, in France and in the Netherlands). This is possibly a different Newton from the one we are so accustomed to. Thus, reconstructing Newton's legacy for the early Kant's philosophy of nature can be a daunting exercise at the key junction of Kantian studies, intellectual and social history of science, as well as history of philosophy. Important work has been done to assess the nuanced legacy of Newton for Kant's philosophy of nature, in particular for Kant's view on the laws of nature. Buchdahl 5 famously argued for the so-called 'looseness of fit' between Kant's transcendental apparatus and the foundations of physical science against the standard view, which for 5 Buchdahl (1974) . long time had maintained a strict link between the two. For example, the role of the category of quality in providing a priori justification for Kant's Dynamics in MAN was challenged. 6 The empirical laws of Newtonian mechanics were regarded as established not top-down (from the Principles of the Transcendental Analytic) but bottom-up, from the special metaphysics of nature, and in particular from the empirical concept of matter.
Since the early 1990s, against both the standard view and Buchdahl's 'looseness of fit' interpretation, Friedman has argued that Kant's transcendental project should be read as providing the philosophical groundwork for Newton's physics. 7 What is at stake in Friedman's interpretation is neither the contentious view that the lawfulness of nature under the transcendental laws of the understanding (e.g., causality, for example) per se guarantees or licenses empirical laws of nature. Nor that empirical laws are known a priori, like their transcendental counterparts. Instead, on Friedman's view, something like the a priori principle of causality has to be in place for us to recognize a sequence of events or uniformities in nature as lawlike (pace Hume), even if particular laws of nature can only be empirically discovered. Anti-Newtonian aspects have also been found in Kant's Universal Natural History, 6 For further details on this point and a critical discussion of the standard view, see Watkins (1998B) . 7 Friedman (1992a Friedman ( ), (1992b Friedman ( ), (2013 . 8 Watkins (1998a) rightly notes that Newton's second law is absent among Kant's laws, and even Kant's formulation of the law of inertia is effectively different from Newton. 9 Stan (2013) . 10 Warren (2010) . Contra Warren, Smith (2013a) has defended a Newtonian reading of the balancing argument.
whereby the order and lawfulness of nature is not ascribed directly to God's hand but to matter and its necessary laws. 11 Similar anti-Newtonian sentiments, this time along Spinoza's lines, have been recounted in Universal Natural History. 12 there is yet another Newton-a more experimental Newton, who speculated about the ether and chemical reactions in the Queries of the Opticks-that in my view has not 11 Watkins (2013) . 12 Schliesser (2013) . 13 Massimi and De Bianchi (2013) . 14 To be precise, absolute space did not disappear entirely in the Critical period. Indeed, it reappears for example in the General Remark to Phenomenology in MAN as a necessary concept of reason. 15 Kant (1781 Kant ( /1787 Kant ( /1997 ): A23/B37. As it is custom, the A refers to the first (1781) edition and the B to the second (1787) edition. 16 Thus, my second (more philosophical) goal is to urge a note of caution against the received view that has portrayed Kant as sitting squarely within the Newtonian tradition from the very beginning. If by "Newtonian tradition", we mean the Newtonian mechanics of the Principia and the ensuing tradition in mechanics that developed out of it, there seems to be evidence to suggest a more nuanced reappraisal of this claim. Massimi (2011) , and I refer the interested reader to that paper for further details on this topic. 19 AA 4: 537. Kant (1786 Kant ( /2004 . For the influence of this earlier debate on vis viva on Kant's True estimation and its lingering echoes in the aforementioned passage of MAN, see Massimi and De Bianchi (2013) . In Section 2, I offer a brief overview of the historical context to assess Newton's legacy on the young Kant, by paying attention to the role of the Opticks in the first half of the eighteenth century and to Continental Newtonianism. In Section 3, I turn to the philosophical question as to whether the pre-Critical Kant around 1748-1768 did in fact endorse Newton's absolute space, before turning to transcendental idealism. I make some remarks, which-tentative as they might be-suggest, nonetheless, a more cautious answer to the question.
The pre-Critical Kant and its Newtonian milieu
Before making my case for a nuanced picture of Newton's impact on the pre-Critical Kant, it may be worth recalling briefly the intellectual context in which the young Kant was educated and trained, 21 and draw attention to the wider Newtonian context of the first half of the eighteenth century. As Isaac Bernhard Cohen originally pointed out, 22 two very different Newtonian traditions were present at the time: the experimental Newtonianism, typical of the Opticks (first English edition 1704; first Latin edition 1706, and second English edition 1717); and the mathematical Newtonianism, more evident in the Principia (first edition 1687, second edition 1713, third edition 1726). 23 In the first Latin edition and the second English edition of the Opticks, Newton introduced two sets of Queries, where he relegated the most general, often highly speculative, principles that could be inductively drawn from observations and experiments. Among them, the ether 20 For an excellent reconstruction of how Kant's matter theory of this period, especially evident in Physical Monadology, borrows from and, at the same time, distances itself from Leibniz, Wolff, and also Baumgarten, see Watkins (2006) . 21 See Pozzo and Oberhausen (2002) and Kuehn (2001) . 22 Cohen (1956) . For a more recent, and somehow antithetic trend about Newton's legacy in the Continent (especially in relation to chemistry), see Principe (2007) 23 Of course, this broad methodological distinction between the Opticks and the Principia does not capture important nuances, i.e. experimental aspects present in the Principia, for example, and mathematical stages present in the Opticks (I thank Chris Smeenk for raising this point). More recently, Ahnert (forthcoming) has made a similar point about the separation of Newton's mathematics from Newton's natural philosophy and why the latter spread more successfully in the German-speaking countries. Not only was Newton's mathematics too complex to be taught in Philosophy Faculties; Newton's mathematics was also regarded as lacking a proper metaphysical foundation. featured prominently as a medium for the explanation of gravity, optical, thermal, and even electrical phenomena.
In the first edition of the Principia Newton argued against the ether and provided a mathematical treatment for the behavior of elastic fluids, which did not require any subtle matter. 24 But the hypothesis of the ether returned prominently in the Queries of the Opticks, after a premature appearance in Newton's pre-Principia matter theory. 25 The existence of a very subtle ether was introduced to explain how light was refracted and reflected, as well as the transmission of heat among bodies (Query 18), and a possible gravitational mechanism for planetary motion (Query 21). 26 In addition to the ether, speculations about chemical phenomena, metal combustions (with the ensuing release of 'true permanent air',) and fermentations of various substances too featured in the Queries of the Opticks. In Query 31, for example, Newton famously introduced the two active principles of attraction and repulsion, as the "cause of Gravity" and the "cause of Fermentation", respectively, 27 through which matter in the universe was said to be continuously preserved from decaying. Repulsive force was associated with chemical phenomena of fermentations, through which air (qua physical seat of repulsive force, trapped in the pores of various substances) would be released.
A time-honored historiographical tradition has long emphasized the role that the Newtonian experimentalism of the Opticks-with its speculations on fermentations, chemical reactions with Aqua fortis, and the ether-exercised on the natural philosophy of the first half of the eighteenth-century. 28 According to this historiographical tradition, 24 See Book II, Proposition XXIII, Theorem XVIII of the Principia for example. 25 See Newton's famous letter to Boyle (28 February 1678-9) published in Boyle (1744), and the pre-Principia text De Aere et Aethere (written probably around 1674). Newton's speculations on the ether took the lead from Boyle's experimental tradition (especially, Boyle's experiments on calcination of metals). In De Aere et Aethere, Newton claimed that air was composed of particles repelling each other with a certain force. In the letter to Boyle, repulsive force was re-assigned from the air to the ether, and the rarefaction of the ether was taken to be responsible for the endeavor of bodies to recede. 26 Similar attempts to use the ether as a gravitational mechanism can be found in Descartes's vortex theory, Leibniz's continuum elastic ether (in the Tentamen written in response to Newton's first edition of the Principia), as well as in Euler. For a survey of ether theories at the time, see Aiton (1972) . 27 Newton (1704/1717/1752), Query 31, p. 395 28 This historiographical trend began with the work of Metzger (1930) , and Guerlac (1950) and Cohen (1956) . For a recent dissenting voice, see Principe (2007) . It is beyond my expertise and my aim here to enter into this historiographical debate. My concern here is not so much about which chemical school proved more influential in the Continent in the first half of the eighteenth century, but rather which Newtonian aspects can be found in the pre-Critical Kant's reflections on natural philosophy. more than Newton's mechanics in the Principia (whose mathematical language and technical results demanded a level of knowledge not easily available at the time), it was Newton's chemistry and matter theory in the Opticks that had a far-reaching influence for natural philosophy both in Britain and in the Continent at the time.
In Britain, the Opticks influenced the work of an entire generation of iatrochemists, including the brothers John and James Keill, 29 Ruestow (1973) . 33 Boerhaave (1732 Boerhaave ( /1735 Metzger (1930) , p. 56, identified Boerhaave as the main source behind Boscovich's dynamical theory of matter, whereby attraction is understood in terms of gravitation and repulsion in terms of imponderable fluids such as caloric. 35 See Massimi (2011) .
In what follows, I suggest that the way Kant came to elaborate his view of space from True estimation to Directions in space betrays once more his idiosyncratic blend of the Wolffian and the Newtonian traditions. In particular, it reveals the far-reaching influence of Newton's matter theory and chemistry on a still broadly Wolffian-relationalist framework. I argue for the following three points: In the next Section, I go on to substantiate points (i.a)-(iii.a). While the language of things coexisting in space and succeeding one another in time might sound reminiscent of Newton's absolute space and time as the ultimate containers of everything that exists, nothing could in fact be more remote from it. 37 See Ahnert (forthcoming). 38 See Leibniz (1695 Leibniz ( /1969 . 39 For an excellent analysis of this debate on the nature of monads from Leibniz, to Wolff, Baumgarten and the pre-Critical Kant, please see Watkins (2006) . 40 Kant (1747 Kant ( / 2012 For, as Kant points out later in the text, "it is easy to show that there would be no space and no extension if substances had no force to act external to themselves. For without this force, there is no connection, without connection, no order, and finally, without order, no space. Yet it is somewhat more difficult to see how the plurality of dimensions in space derives from the law according to which this force of substances acts externally". 42 Kant's working hypothesis was not Newton's absolute space as a privileged reference frame for bodies in motion, but instead the Wolffian nexus rerum. consistent with the assumption that bodies consisted of a determinate number of simple parts (Corollary. Proposition IV. Theorem). 44 Kant motivated his stark conclusion on the ground that "space, which is entirely free from substantiality and which is the appearance of the external relations of unitary monads, will not at all be exhausted by division continued to infinity". 45 The previous notion of space as ensuing from the reciprocal actions of substances 46 finds its ultimate expression in a dynamical scenario of physical monads as point-like entities surrounded by spheres of activities, through which space is filled.
The pre-Critical Kant on space.

Beyond Wolffian relationalism and Newtonian absolutism
Following Baumgarten, Kant called the force through which physical monads fill the space "impenetrability", as a fundamental repulsive force acting by direct contact among elements of any body. In Kant's picture, space was constituted by the action and reaction of simple elements of bodies or physical monads. Their respective spheres of activity were in direct contact via repelling forces responsible for filling the space by making 44 AA 1: 478-480. Kant (1756 Kant ( /1992 . 45 AA 1: 479. Kant (1756 Kant ( /1992 . 46 See on this point also New Elucidation, where Kant spelled out his view of space as being constituted by the "interconnected actions of substances, reaction always being of necessity conjoined with such interconnected actions" AA1: 415. Kant (1755b Kant ( /1992 . Given this picture, saying that the divisibility of space is restricted to the divisibility of substances' external relations implies that spatial divisibility cuts physical monads 'at their joints', so to speak, i.e. along the tangents to the points of contact among their respective spheres of activity. But how is this possible? This kind of spatial divisibility would be finite and discrete (cutting physical monads' joints) and at quite a distance form Keill's infinite geometrical divisibility that Kant has just defended. 47 AA 1: 484. Kant (1756 Kant ( /1992 . In Universal Natural History, just a year earlier, Kant had developed a dynamical cosmogony based on primitive attractive and repulsive forces applied to 'fine matter', which he thought must have filled the space at the origin of the cosmos. For a penetrating analysis of the way repulsive and attractive forces are balanced in Kant's physical monads and for its divergence from Boschovich, see Smith (2013b) .
Here is then the problem: how can physical monads fill space via their spheres of activity, and space being infinitely divisible without:
(a) either jeopardizing the simplicity and unity of the monads (pace monadology) (b) or reaching the contradictory conclusion that the divisibility of space (qua external relations among substances) can only be finite and discrete (i.e. along the boundaries of physical monads and their contact points, pace Keill's proof of the infinite divisibility of space).
In my view, this conundrum can be solved by bringing in considerations from Newtonian experimentalism; in particular, by considering Kant's sui generis treatment of repulsive force as a contact force through which physical monads fill space by resisting penetration from each other. I said sui generis treatment because in Proposition XI.
Theorem, against the standard Newtonian view of specific density of bodies as the ratio between mass and volume, whereby bodies with the same volume may nonetheless possess different specific densities because of the different amount of interstitial vacua, Kant offered an alternative view. On Kant's view, bodies of different kinds (e.g. "ether, air, water, and gold") had different densities simply because they possessed different inherent inertia (or inertial mass) of their elements. 48 Specific densities were not explained by a greater or smaller vacuum interposed among the pores of different kinds of substances. For even the interstices of denser bodies, which are narrower, could be penetrated by less dense bodies such as "fire, and the magnetic and electric fluid", Kant argued. Instead, specific densities were due to a perfectly elastic force "which is different in different things", and which constituted "a medium which is, in itself and without the admixture of a vacuum, primitively elastic" (Proposition XIII. Theorem). As a primary example of elastic bodies, Kant mentioned the ether, "that is to say, the matter of fire", with an unequivocal homage to Boerhaave's material fire, in continuity with another of Kant's writings of this time, On Fire, where the ether was presented as both the matter of fire and the matter of light. 49 Thus, we see here exemplified an interesting way in which the view of space expounded in Physical Monadology borrows elements from the Newtonian experimentalist tradition. To avoid the aforementioned conundrum of either jeopardizing the simplicity and unity of the monads, or making the divisibility of space finite and discrete, Kant originally availed himself of a distinctively Newtonian experimentalist view of repulsive 48 AA 1: 485-486. Kant (1756 Kant ( /1992 . 49 For an analysis of On Fire see Massimi (2011) .
force qua a perfectly elastic force, coming in different degrees in different kinds of materials (e.g., ether, air, water, gold). By understanding the impenetrability of bodies, and hence the boundaries of the spheres of activity of physical monads, as defined by the action of a perfectly elastic repulsive force, Kant could eschew the conundrum:
(a 1 ) the simplicity and unity of physical monads is safeguarded by thinking of space along relationalist lines, as a bunch of external relations holding among their respective spheres of activity.
(b 1 ) the infinite divisibility of space is guaranteed if we think of those impenetrable spheres of activities as a 'force field', the field of a perfectly elastic repulsive force that fills the space, like Boerhaave's fire, electric and magnetic fluids, or ultimately, like the ether qua the subtle matter of fire and light.
Physical monads produce space via their external determinations, namely via their causal powers (attraction and repulsion). The continuity of space ensues from the continuity in the exercise of these causal powers (e.g. the continuous way in which the elastic force, as a subtle fluid, fills everything and acts by direct contact on other monads (with no vacua and no empty interstices). At the same time, just like a perfectly elastic subtle fluid that can be cut or sliced (so to speak) as one wishes, without destroying the simplicity or unity of the fluid itself, similarly Keill's geometrical proof of the infinite divisibility of space could be reconciled with the unity and simplicity of the monads, without running the risk of cutting physical monads 'at their joints' and making spatial divisibility finite and discrete.
The Newtonian "geometers" (i.e. Keill) were reconciled with the "metaphysicians" There are three clues in Kant's text, which in my view speak once again for a more nuanced debt to Newtonianism. For start, there is surprisingly no mention of Newton in the text. But this detail per se may not be very revealing. The question remains as to whether Kant was in fact defending Newton's absolute space; or, was he instead holding on to Newton's terminology, but devoid of its Newtonian connotations. I suggest that the latter option is more likely to be the case.
First, the declared goal of the essay was to offer a proof intended for "geometers" of the claim that absolute space has a reality of its own. Kant lamented, by tacitly referring to the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, that no metaphysical argument had been successful in establishing this claim. Nor were a posteriori proofs for absolute space available, Kant claimed, apart from Euler's attempt to provide one for the prize essay of the Berlin Royal Academy of Sciences in 1748. 53 But Kant discarded Euler's as a proof intended for the engineers, not for "geometers". Moreover, Euler's proof was said to fail to engage with the difficulties arising when one tries to "represent [universal laws of motion] in concreto, employing the concept of absolute space". 54 Did Kant ignore Newton's own arguments for absolute space (i.e. the famous thought experiments concerning the bucket of water and the tied-globes)? Why does Kant say that there are 50 For an interpretive analysis of this text, and its continuity with some of Kant's mature views on rotation and relative motion, see Stan (forthcoming) . 51 AA 2: 377. Kant (1768 Kant ( /1992 . 52 AA 2: 378. Kant (1768 Kant ( /1992 . 53 See Stan (2012), p. 465. 54 AA 2: 378. Kant (1768 Kant ( /1992 . serious difficulties if we try to represent laws of motion in concreto by employing the concept of absolute space? Was not Newton's absolute space introduced precisely to ground the laws of motion and to provide a privileged reference frame to distinguish between inertial and non-inertial motions? Kant's complaint against Euler's proof (and perhaps Newton's one too) could be explained if read against the backdrop of Euler's distinction between the Metaphysicians, who denied that absolute space and time had any reality of their own, and the Mathematicians, who on the contrary considered space and place as real things. A charitable reading of Kant's above claim would then be that Euler's proof for absolute space cut no ice with the German metaphysicians because it presupposed precisely what the metaphysicians would question, namely the reality of absolute space.
Thus, with an eye to providing a geometrical proof for absolute space that could speak for the ear of the German metaphysicians, Kant drew attention to three different considerations:
(I)
We can have empirical knowledge of things outside ourselves only insofar as these things entertain a particular relation to ourselves, and to our bodies. In Cartesian coordinates, if we take our body as the origin of the three axes, we can establish the distinction between above and below; left and right; in front of and behind. Similar reference to our body is inevitably presupposed in the indexical use of geographical maps and the compass.
(II) Features found in some animal species (e.g., snails' shells) and vegetable ones (e.g., the growth of beans and hops) reveal incongruent counterparts, despite the objects having same size, same proportion, and even same relative positions of their parts.
(III) Incongruent counterparts seem to play a key role also in the "mechanical organization of the human body", whereby Kant claimed that the majority of people are right-handed, while according to Borrelli and Bonnet, left eyes and left ears have more sensibility.
These three different considerations pave the way to Kant's conclusion that "the ground of the complete determination of a corporeal form does not depend simply on the relation and position of its parts to each other; it also depends on the reference of that provide the foundation for the compositionality of matter, rather than the other way around (i.e., space being a consequence of matter filling space in virtue of physical monads as spheres of activity).
The essay closes with the eloquent remark that "absolute space is not an object of outer sensation; it is rather a fundamental concept which first of all makes possible all such outer sensation". 57 Kant referred to absolute space not as a real object, or substance, but as a Grundbegriff, which acted as a pre-condition of our sensible experience, anticipating his mature view of space as an a priori form of sensibility. The reality of space was also said to be "intuitive enough for inner sense", while difficulties arise if we attempt to "philosophise about the ultimate data of our cognition". Absolute space cannot be perceived as an outer object, nor be known as an object of experience.
Instead, in remarkable continuity with the two-year later Inaugural Dissertation, space was presented as a concept, which makes possible our experience of nature. 58 The road to the 57 AA 2: 383. Kant (1768 Kant ( /1992 . 58 In the Inaugural Dissertation, space is said to be again a "concept…not abstracted from outer sensation" but somehow presupposed in the possibility of outer perceptions (AA 2: 402), and even a "pure intuition…as the fundamental form of all outer sensation" Kant (1770 Kant ( /1992 .
Transcendental Aesthetic was still very long. But the groundbreaking path to it had been opened.
Conclusion
Newton's legacy for Kant has been the object of sustained scholarly efforts over the past 
